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Exploiting Weak Supermodularity for Coalition-Proof Mechanisms
Orcun Karaca and Maryam Kamgarpour
Abstract— Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the
auction to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations
were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market objective
is supermodular. Nevertheless, several auctions do not satisfy
the stringent conditions for supermodularity. These auctions
include electricity markets, which are the main motivation of
our paper. To address this issue, we introduce the supermodu-
larity ratio and the weak supermodularity. We show that these
concepts provide us with tight bounds on the profitability of
collusion and shill bidding. We then derive an analytical lower
bound on the supermodularity ratio. Our results are verified
with case studies based on the IEEE test systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last couple of decades, electricity markets have
been undergoing a rapid transformation from tightly regu-
lated monopolies to deregulated competitive market struc-
tures [1]. This restructuring has been essential to improve
economic efficiency and attract new investments [2]. De-
signing electricity markets is not a simple task since supply
and demand of electricity need to be balanced in every
instance of time. Specifically, high penetration of intermittent
renewable energy sources presents challenges in maintaining
this stability [3]. Hence, there has been a surge of interest
from the control community on studying various electricity
markets [4]–[7].
This work studies a subset of the existing market mech-
anisms, conducted as reverse auctions. In these markets,
generators submit their bids, and then an independent system
operator determines the power allocation and the payment for
each generator. The allocation rule is the economic dispatch
which secures a reliable operation. Then, the central element
of the market design is the payment rule, since the generators
have incentives to strategize around it. In particular, the op-
erator designs the payment rule to ensure that the generators
reveal their true costs in order to achieve a stable grid with
maximum social welfare [2].
Previous work on electricity markets considered the pay-
as-bid [6] and the locational marginal pricing mecha-
nisms [8]. In both mechanisms, generators can bid strategi-
cally to influence their profits since these mechanisms do not
incentivize truthful bidding. Studies have shown that strategic
manipulations have increased electricity prices substantially
in these markets [9]. As an alternative, under the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, truthful bidding is the
dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium [10]–[12]. As a result,
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every generator finds it more profitable to reveal their true
costs, regardless of the bids of other generators. Due to this
property, several recent works proposed the use of the VCG
mechanism in electricity markets [13], [14].
Despite the desirable theoretical properties of the VCG
mechanism, coalitions of generators can strategically bid to
increase their collective utility. Hence, this mechanism is
susceptible to collusion and shill bidding [15]. Because the
same market participants are involved in similar transactions
day after day, electricity markets can be exposed to such
manipulations [16]. This is crucial since in a larger context
the VCG mechanism is not truthful.
As is outlined in auction literature [15], collusion and shill
bidding occur when the VCG outcome is not in the core.
The core is a concept from coalitional game theory where
the participants have no incentive to leave the coalition of all
participants. As is proven in [7], the VCG outcomes lie in
the core if and only if the market objective is supermodular.
Supermodularity can only be achieved in restricted settings,
such as polymatroid constraints and convex bids. Conse-
quently, electricity markets are generally not supermodular
since technical rigidities result in complex constraint sets.
Our goal is to understand the properties of the VCG
mechanism if the stringent conditions for supermodularity
do not hold. To identify the bottlenecks caused by strategic
manipulations, we aim to provide bounds on the profitability
of collusion and shill bidding by defining the concept of
weak supermodularity. For this concept, we are inspired by
the growing literature on the submodularity ratio [17], [18].
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. First,
we introduce a new way to characterize nonsupermodular
set functions, that is, the supermodularity ratio. This ratio
quantifies how close a function is to being supermodular.
Second, we show that the supermodularity ratio provides
us with tight bounds on the profitability of collusion and
shill bidding under the VCG mechanism. Third, we derive
an analytical lower bound on the supermodularity ratio of
the electricity markets under consideration. Finally, we verify
our results with case studies based on the IEEE test systems.
The results derived on collusion and shill bidding apply to
general auctions run by the VCG mechanism. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work providing such bounds
for VCG outcomes not lying in the core.
In Section II, we introduce the electricity market and
discuss the VCG mechanism. Section III defines the super-
modularity ratio. First, we obtain bounds on collusion and
shill bidding, see Theorem 1. We then provide a lower bound
on the supermodularity ratio of the markets, see Theorem 2.
In Section IV, we present the numerical results.
II. MECHANISM FRAMEWORK
We start with a generic electricity market reverse auction.
The set of participants consists of the central operator l = 0
and the bidders L = {1, . . . , |L|}. Let there be t types
of power supplies. These types can include the control re-
serves (positive, negative, secondary, tertiary) and the power
injections differentiated by their locations, durations, and
scheduled times. The same type of supplies from different
bidders are perfect substitutes for the central operator. We
assume that each bidder l has a private true cost function
cl : Xl → R+, where 0 ∈ Xl ⊆ Rt+ and cl(0) = 0.
Each bidder l then submits a bid function to the central
operator, denoted by bl : Xˆl → R+, where 0 ∈ Xˆl ⊆ Rt+
and bl(0) = 0. As is discussed in [7, §3.1], this also captures
the traditional multiple-item auction setup.
Given the bid profile B = {bl}l∈L, a mechanism defines
the allocation rule x∗l (B) ∈ Xˆl and the payment rule
pl(B) ∈ R for each bidder l. In many electricity markets,
the allocation is determined by the economic dispatch, that
is, minimizing the aggregate cost subject to some constraints
J(B) = min
x∈Xˆ,y
∑
l∈L
bl(xl) + d(x, y)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0.
(1)
Here y ∈ Rp are variables entering (1) in addition to the
allocation x ∈ Xˆ =∏l∈L Xˆl. The function d : Rt|L|+ ×Rp →
R is an additional cost term. For example, in the case of
a two-stage electricity market, y corresponds to the second
stage variables and d is the second stage cost. The function
g : Rt|L|+ × Rp → Rq defines the constraints1. Finally, if the
problem is infeasible, the objective is J(B) =∞.
Let the optimal solution be denoted by x∗(B) ∈ Xˆ and
y∗(B) ∈ Rp+2. The utility of bidder l is ul(B) = pl(B) −
cl(x
∗
l (B)). A bidder whose bid is not accepted is not paid and
ul(B) = 0. Then, the total payment of the central operator is
given by u0(B) = −
∑
l∈L pl(B)− d(x∗(B), y∗(B)), which
defines the utility of the central operator. Note that this
payment can be an expected value when the function d is
an expected second stage cost.
Three fundamental properties we desire in mechanism
design are individual rationality, efficiency and dominant-
strategy incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is individually
rational if bidders do not face negative utilities, ul(B) ≥ 0,
∀l ∈ L 3. A mechanism is efficient if sum of all utilities∑|L|
l=0 ul(B) is maximized, equivalently, allocation achieves
the lowest objective under true costs. Finally, a mecha-
nism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) if the
truthful bid profile C = {cl}l∈L is the dominant-strategy
Nash equilibrium. In other words, every bidder finds it more
profitable to bid truthfully, regardless of what others bid.
1Problem (1) defines a general class of markets, for example, the en-
ergy and reserve markets [14], [19] and the stochastic markets [20], [21].
2We assume that in case of multiple optima, there is some tie-breaking
rule according to a predetermined fixed ordering of the bidders.
3It is also often referred to as voluntary participation or cost recovery.
A. Payment rules
The design of the payment rule plays a crucial role in
attaining the desirable properties above. We first consider
two prominent payment rules widely used for the electricity
markets, that is, the pay-as-bid mechanism and the locational
marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism.
Under the pay-as-bid mechanism, a rational bidder would
overbid to ensure positive utility. There exist many Nash
equilibria, none of which are incentive-compatible [6]. Under
the LMP mechanism, strategic manipulations become more
complex than the case of the pay-as-bid. A bidder can maxi-
mize its utility by both inflating the bids and withholding its
maximum supply [9]. Furthermore, an equilibrium may not
even exist [22]. In summary, none of these payment rules sat-
isfy the properties of efficiency and incentive-compatibility.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is charac-
terized by the payment rule, pl(B) = bl(x∗l (B))+(h(B−l)−
J(B)). The function h(B−l) ∈ R must be carefully chosen
to ensure individual rationality. We use the Clarke pivot
rule h(B−l) = J(B−l), where J(B−l) denotes the minimum
total cost without bidder l, that is, the optimal value of the
optimization problem in (1) with xl = 0 4. Note that this
mechanism is well-defined if a feasible solution exists when
a bidder is removed. This is not restrictive in the presence
of many bidders and a second-stage market.
Our previous work in [7] shows that the VCG mechanism
satisfies all three fundamental properties for the model in (1).
This result is a generalization of [10]–[12] which do not con-
sider continuous goods, second stage cost and general con-
straints. Dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility makes it
easier for bidders to enter the auction, without spending
resources in computing optimal bidding strategies.
Despite these remarkable theoretical virtues, the VCG
mechanism can suffer from collusion and shill bidding [15].
A subset of bidders K ⊆ L are colluders if they obtain higher
collective utility by changing their bids from CK = {cl}l∈K
to BK = {bl}l∈K . A bidder l is a shill bidder if there exists
a set of bids BS = {bk}k∈S such that the bidder l finds
participating with multiple bids BS more profitable than par-
ticipating with a single truthful bid Cl. These shortcomings
are illustrated by electricity market examples in [7], [13].
This observation motivates us to define coalition-
proofness. By coalition-proof, we mean that a group of
bidders, who lose when bidding their true cost, cannot
profit from collusion, and no bidder can profit from bidding
with multiple identities. We remark that it is not possible
to achieve immunity to the collusions from all sets of
bidders [24]. For instance, no mechanism can eliminate the
case where all bidders inflate their bid prices simultaneously.
B. Core as a coalition-proof outcome
In coalitional game theory, the core defines the set of utili-
ties that cannot be improved upon by forming coalitions5. We
discuss how this concept coincides with coalition-proofness.
4This rule generates the minimum total payment by the central operator
while ensuring individual rationality of the bidders [23, Theorem 1].
5The utility allocation and the auction outcome are used interchangeably.
For every S ⊆ L, let J(BS) be the optimal value of (1)
with x−S = 0, where the stacked vector x−S ∈ Rt(|L|−|S|)+
is defined by omitting the subvectors from S. Note that, this
function is nonincreasing, J(BR) ≤ J(BS), for S ⊆ R. We
refer to J as the market objective. Then, the core Core(C) ∈
R× R|L|+ is defined as{
u ∈ R× R|L|+ |u0 +
∑
l∈L
ul = −J(C),
u0 +
∑
l∈S
ul ≥ −J(CS), ∀S ⊂ L
}
.
(2)
The core is always nonempty because the outcome u0 =
−J(C), ul = 0 for all l ∈ L always lies in the core. Core
outcomes are individually rational since they are restricted
to the nonnegative orthant for the bidders. The equality
constraint in (2) implies that the outcomes are efficient since
the term on the right is maximized. We say that an outcome
is unblocked if no set of bidders can make a deal with the
operator from which everyone can benefit. This condition is
ensured by the inequality constraints.
As is outlined in auction literature [15] and extended to
the market setup (1) in [7, Theorem 3], the VCG mechanism
is coalition-proof if and only if the VCG outcomes lie
in the core. Hence, past work considers characterizing bid
curves and constraints such that the VCG outcome always
lies in the core. To state these results and extend beyond
them, we bring in the definition of supermodularity. For the
following definitions, we use J(S) instead of J(BS) since
the properties are required to hold under any bid profile B.
We denote the set-theoretic difference S \ {l} by S−l.
Definition 1: A function J : 2L → R is supermodular if
J(S) − J(S−l) ≤ J(R) − J(R−l) for all coalitions S ⊆
R ⊆ L and for each bidder l ∈ S. A function Jˆ : 2L → R
is submodular if and only if −Jˆ is supermodular.
For any set of bids, the VCG outcome is in the core
if and only if the market objective J is supermodular [7,
Theorem 2]. Supermodularity of problem (1) is a strong
condition which can only be achieved in restricted settings,
such as constraints of polymatroid-type and convex bids [7,
Theorem 5]. Though the convex bid assumption may be
reasonable in certain markets, the polymatroid constraint
requirement is stringent. In particular, DC-OPF markets
involve polytopic constraints and a polytope is in general not
a polymatroid. In such instances, the market objective is in
general not supermodular. As a result, the VCG mechanism
suffers from collusion and shill bidding. To the best of
our knowledge, there does not exist any result bounding
the profitability of such manipulations, in case the objective
function is not supermodular. Therefore, we aim to quantify
the coalition-proofness property of the VCG mechanism
under more general bid functions and constraints. As a
remark, all the following results hold for any general auction
over continuous (or discrete) goods with complex constraints.
III. APPROXIMATING COALITION-PROOFNESS
For the results in this section, we are inspired by the grow-
ing literature on the submodularity ratio [17], [18]. We first
define the supermodularity ratio to quantify how close a set
function is to being supermodular. Using the supermodularity
ratio, we then introduce the weak supermodularity condition
for the market objective in problem (1). Finally, we show
that this condition indeed provides us with an approximate
coalition-proofness certificate for the VCG mechanism.
Definition 2: The supermodularity ratio of a nonnegative
set function J : 2L → R+ is the largest γsup such that
γsup
[∑
l∈K
J(S−l)− J(S)
]
≤ J(S−K)− J(S), ∀K,S ⊆ L.
In literature, submodularity ratio is defined to quantify how
close a nonnegative set function is to being submodular [17],
[18]. Since the function J is supermodular if and only if −J
is submodular, it may seem natural to use the submodularity
ratio to describe how close −J is to being submodular.
However, this ratio is only defined over nonnegative set func-
tions. Even if we allow for nonpositive functions, it does not
provide any useful information for our purposes. In addition,
this ratio can be zero in the cases where supermodularity
ratio is positive. As an alternative, these works also discuss
curvature to quantify how close a nondecreasing set function
is to being supermodular. However, the objective in (1) is
nonincreasing and curvature is unbounded for nonincreasing
set functions [17].
Motivated by the discussion above, we derive some im-
portant observations for the supermodularity ratio of nonin-
creasing set functions.
Proposition 1: The following statements hold for a non-
increasing set function: (i) γsup ∈ [0, 1], (ii) this function is
supermodular if and only if γsup = 1.
The proof can be found in the extended version of our pa-
per [25]. We define a set function to be weakly supermodular
if γsup > 0. Next, we show that the weak supermodularity
provides us with bounds on both shill bidding and collusion,
hence, we achieve approximate coalition-proofness.
Theorem 1: For the bidders L, consider a VCG mecha-
nism modeled by (1). If J is weakly supermodular, then,
(i) A subset of bidders K ⊆ L who lose when bidding
their true values cannot profit more than
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(C−K ,BK)],
by a joint deviation BK . For any joint deviation BK ,
this total profit is upperbounded by
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(C−K ,B0K)],
where the bid profile B0K is the set of bids bl(xl) =
0, ∀xl ∈ Xl, ∀l ∈ K.
(ii) For any bidder l, the profit from bidding with the set of
bids BS is at most
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,BS)]
more than the profit from a single truthful bid Cl. For
any set of bids BS , this value is upperbounded by
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,B0l )]
where the bid B0l is given by bl(xl) = 0, ∀xl ∈ Xl.
Proof: (i) Let K be a set of colluders who would lose
the auction when bidding their true values CK = {cl}l∈K ,
while bidding BK = {bl}l∈K they become winners, that
is, they are all allocated a positive quantity. We then define
C = (C−K , CK) and B = (C−K ,BK) where C−K =
{cl}l∈L\K denotes the bidding profile of the remaining
bidders. The total VCG utility that colluders receive under B,∑
l∈K u
VCG
l (B), is
=
∑
l∈K
J(B−l)− J(B) + bl(x∗l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
≤ γ−1sup [J(B−K)− J(B)] +
∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
= [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(B)] + J(C)
−
[ ∑
l∈L\K
cl(x
∗
l (B)) +
∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B)) + d(x∗(B), y∗(B))
]
+
[∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
]
= [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(B)] + J(C)−
[∑
l∈L
cl(x
∗
l (B))
+ d(x∗(B), y∗(B))
]
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(B)]
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(C−K ,B0K)].
The first equality follows from the VCG payments. The
first inequality follows from the weak supermodularity. The
second equality comes from the fact that K was a group of
losers, so J(B−K) = J(C−K) = J(C). We also add and
subtract the term [J(C)−J(B)]. After substituting these, we
see that the term in brackets is the cost of C but evaluated
at a feasible suboptimal allocation (x∗(B), y∗(B)). Then,
the second inequality follows from the fact that the term
in the brackets is lower bounded by J(C). This yields the
first statement. Finally, the third inequality is obtained from
J(C−K ,B0K) ≤ J(B). This holds since x∗(B) has to be a
feasible solution to J(C−K ,B0K). This concludes the proof.
(ii) Similar to part (i), define C = (C−l, Cl). Shill bids of
bidder l are given by BS = {bk}k∈S . We define a merged bid
B˜l as b˜l(xl) = minxk∈Xˆk, ∀k
∑
k∈S bk(xk) s.t.
∑
k∈S xk =
xl. We then define B˜ = (C−l, B˜l). The VCG utility from
shill bidding under B = (C−l,BS),
∑
k∈S u
VCG
k (B), is
=
∑
k∈S
[J(B−k)− J(B) + bk(x∗k(B))]− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
≤ γ−1sup [J(B−S)− J(B)] +
∑
k∈S
bk(x
∗
k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= γ−1sup [J(C−l)− J(B˜)] + b˜l(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= [γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(B˜)] + uVCGl (B˜)
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,BS)] + uVCGl (C)
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,B0l )] + uVCGl (C)
The first inequality follows from the weak supermodularity
of J . The second equality holds since we have J(B˜) = J(B).
This follows from the definition of the merged bid and the
following implication. Since the same type of supplies are
perfect substitutes for the central operator, the functions g
and d in fact depend on
∑
l∈L xl. The third equality follows
from adding and subtracting the term [J(C−l)− J(B˜)]. The
second inequality is the DSIC property of the VCG mech-
anism. This yields the first statement. Finally, the third in-
equality is obtained from J(C−l,B0l ) ≤ J(B˜) = J(C−l,BS).
This holds since x∗(B˜) is a feasible suboptimal solution to
the problem defined by J(C−l,B0l ). This concludes the proof
of part (ii).
Theorem 1 provides the first bounds on the profitabil-
ity of collusion or shill bidding even for the cases when
the outcome of the VCG mechanism is not in the core.
In summary, as the supermodularity ratio gets larger, the
function J gets closer to being supermodular, and we obtain
tighter bounds on the profitabiliy of collusion and shill
bidding. Furthermore, if γsup = 1, we obtain exact coalition-
proofness. As is proven in Proposition 1-(ii), this result
coincides with the one on supermodularity in [7, Theorem 3].
In practice, achieving the profit in Theorem 1 may still be
difficult since in general, the bidders need full information on
the market constraints and other bidders to collude optimally.
Following from these discussions, a natural question is
whether the function J in (1) satisfies weak supermodularity.
Theorem 2: The objective function J in (1) is weakly
supermodular. Its supermodularity ratio satisfies γsup ≥
1/kfeas > 0, where kfeas is the maximum number of bidders
that can be removed while ensuring the feasibility of (1).
Proof: For supermodularity ratio, we aim to derive the
tightest lower bound on
J(S−K)− J(S)∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S)
,
for all K,S ⊆ L. There are four possible cases to consider.
(1) If J(S−K)−J(S) = 0 and
∑
l∈K J(S−l)−J(S) = 0,
then, for this instance, the ratio is 1.
(2) The case where we have J(S−K)− J(S) > 0 and∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) = 0 can be ignored, since we are
looking for a lower bound.
(3) Consider the case of
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0 but
J(S−K)− J(S) = 0. We show that this can never be the
case for the model in (1). Since the objective function is
nonincreasing we have J(R) ≤ J(S) for S ⊆ R. Then,
J(S−K) ≥ J(S−l) ≥ J(S), for all l ∈ K and K,S ⊆ L.
As a result, we obtain J(S−K) ≥ J(S−l) ≥ J(S−K), or
equivalently J(S−K) = J(S−l). This observation yields∑
l∈K
J(S−l)− J(S) =
∑
l∈K
J(S−K)− J(S) = 0,
which contradicts the initial assumption.
(4) Finally, we consider the case of J(S−K)− J(S) > 0
and
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0. This yields a positive lower
bound on the supermodularity ratio. Note that if J(S−l)
is infeasible, so is J(S−K). Hence, we can ignore such
infeasible sets for computing a lower bound. Restrict-
ing our attention to the case of J(S−K)− J(S) > 0 and
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0, a bound on γsup is given by
γsup = min
S,K⊆L
|K|≤kfeas
J(S−K)− J(S)∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S)
≥ min
S,K⊆L
w∈K, |K|≤kfeas
J(S−K)− J(S)
|K|[J(S−w)− J(S)]
≥ min
S,K⊆L
w∈K, |K|≤kfeas
J(S−w)− J(S)
|K|[J(S−w)− J(S)] =
1
kfeas
> 0.
The equality follows from ignoring infeasible sets. The first
inequality follows from w yielding the maximum value for
J(S−l) − J(S), over l ∈ K. The second inequality comes
from J(S−K) ≥ J(S−w). Since
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0
and w yields the maximum, we have J(S−w) − J(S) > 0.
We obtain the final equality. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 2 shows that any electricity market auction mod-
eled by (1) is weakly supermodular, and its supermodularity
ratio is lower bounded by 1/kfeas ≥ 1/|L| > 0. Furthermore,
we obtain γsup = 1 if the problem (1) is infeasible whenever
any two bidders are removed. This is an alternative proof
to [7, Proposition 1]. However, the derived lower bound is
generally conservative. In Section IV, we obtain larger super-
modularity ratios from studies based on realistic electricity
markets. In the numerics, we also discuss a computationally
efficient method for computing the supermodularity ratio.
In summary, the VCG mechanism satisfies the approxi-
mate coalition-proofness for the electricity markets modeled
by (1). Subsequently, we can provide bounds on the prof-
itability of collusion and shill bidding. In addition, better
approximate coalition-proofness properties are achieved if
the objective function J is close to being supermodular.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Our goal is to show the effectiveness of the supermodular-
ity ratio to predict collusion potential in electricity markets.
We start by providing a simple example to show that the
upper bound in Theorem 1 and the lower bound in Theorem 2
are attained. Then, we consider IEEE test systems with
DC power flow models. These markets do not satisfy the
stringent conditions for supermodularity when line limits are
present. We calculate the supermodularity ratios of these
systems and show that they are close to 1. Consequently,
we obtain tight bounds on collusion and shill bidding.
Before discussing the numerical results, we explain the
computation method for the supermodularity ratio in Defini-
tion 2. To calculate γsup, we need to solve up to 2|L| instances
of the market problem (1) and then we could form the
following linear program with up to 22|L| linear constraints,
γsup =argmax
γ
γ
s.t. γ
[∑
l∈K
J(BS\l)− J(BS)
]
≤ J(BS\K)− J(BS),
(3)
for all K,S ⊆ L. To deal with the exponential size, we
use the constraint generation approach proposed in [26]. The
method proceeds as follows. We initialize the algorithm by
setting γsup = 1. For this candidate solution, we can formu-
late another problem that finds the constraint in (3) with the
largest violation, that is, the largest γsup[
∑
l∈K J(BS\l) −
J(BS)]− [J(BS\K)−J(BS)]. For this formulation, we refer
to [7]. We then obtain another candidate solution by finding
the largest ratio that satisfies this violated constraint. The al-
gorithm iterates between two problems and converges to the
supermodularity ratio [26, Theorem 4.2]. This algorithm may
still require the generation of all constraints, but in practice,
it converges fast. Note that, this problem also needs to be
solved under all bid profiles. We tackle this by solving (3)
for many randomly generated bid profiles and setting the
supermodularity ratio as the minimum of these ratios.
A. A simple example for Theorems 1 and 2
Let  be a small positive number. Suppose the central
operator has to procure 800 MW of power supply from
bidders 1, 2 and 3 who have the true costs $600 for 800
MW, $300 +  for 400 MW and $300 +  for 400 MW,
respectively. Under the VCG mechanism, the dominant-
strategy Nash equilibrium is truthful bidding. Hence, assume
all the bidders are truthful. As a result, bidder 1 wins and
receives pVCG1 = 600+(600+2−600) = $600+2. Invoking
Theorem 2, we obtain the lower bound γsup ≥ 1/2 since
kfeas = 2. In fact, this lower bound is tight. It can be verified
by evaluating the constraints in Definition 2 that under any
set of bid prices, supermodularity ratio is γsup = 1/2.
Now, suppose bidders 2 and 3 collude and change their
bids to $0 for 400 MW. Then, bidders 2 and 3 win and
receive a payment of $600 each. The total VCG utility
they receive is $600 − 2. In this case, the upper bound in
Theorem 1 is tight since [γ−1sup − 1][J(C) − J(C−K ,B0K)] =
[1/(1/2) − 1][600 − 0] = $600. For this example, we
highlight that, for bidders 2 and 3, lowering bid prices to
zero results in the largest profit these bidders can achieve
by collusion. However, in general, it is not straightforward
how to optimally collude, if the bidders do not have full
information on the market constraints and other bidders.
B. IEEE test systems with DC power flow models
In wholesale electricity markets, central operator’s prob-
lem involves a power grid model with network balance
constraints. In this section, we adopt the DC power flow
model [8]. This model assumes lossless lines, constant bus
voltages, and small phase angle differences. Under the LMP
mechanism, the generators may act strategically to manipu-
late these markets [9]. The work in [14] proposed the VCG
mechanism as a way to handle this issue. However, these
markets have quadratic bids and polytopic constraints. Even
though the bid curves are convex, the polytopic constraint
set of a DC power flow is not a polymatroid whenever the
line limits are present. For this reason, the VCG mechanism
can suffer from collusion and shill bidding [7].
Here, we consider the IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus
test systems in [27]. In [7, §5.2], we analyzed the VCG
payments and how they compare with the payments for the
LMP and the pay-as-bid mechanisms. In this work, we focus
on the supermodularity ratio to quantify coalition-proofness
for each system. To identify the collusion potential under any
market instance, the supermodularity ratio computations are
further verified by choosing the coefficients of the quadratic
bids from a uniform distribution.
For the 14-bus example, we have 10 MWh limits on lines
exiting node 1 and connecting it to nodes 2 and 5. Even
though the bids are convex, the polytopic constraint set is
not a polymatroid and conditions for supermodularity do not
hold. Invoking Theorem 2 we obtain a lower bound γsup ≥
1/2 since kfeas = 2. In contrast, the estimated supermodular-
ity ratio, calculated using the constraint generation approach
discussed above, is 0.76. Next, we consider the bid curves
in [27]. Since all bidders are allocated a positive quantity, we
add two losing bidders at nodes 1 and 5. The supermodularity
ratio indicates that losing bidder’s collective profit from
collusion would be upper bounded by $1296, which is 11%
of the total VCG payment. Similar bounds are obtained
for other possible colluders. We conclude that Theorem 1
provides us with bounds on strategic manipulations.
Similarly, the 30-bus system also has polytopic constraints
and the conditions for supermodularity do not hold. By
contrast, we calculated the supermodularity ratio to be 1. This
verifies the exact coalition-proofness of the 30-bus system
under the VCG mechanism. This result can be explained in
two ways. First, none of the line limits are tight at the optimal
solution. Second, removing two bidders yields an infeasible
problem in most cases.
In the case of the 118-bus system, the constraint set
is a polymatroid because there are no line limits in [27].
It follows that the market objective is supermodular [7,
Theorem 5]. Additionally, supermodularity ratio is calculated
to be 1, as is proven in Proposition 1-(ii). For the bid
curves in [27], there are two losing generators located at
nodes 1 and 4. Suppose these two losing generators form a
coalition and lower their bids to zero. Then, their collective
profit decreases from $0 to −$439.8. Invoking Theorem 1,
collusion is not profitable for any set of colluders who lose
when bidding their true costs.
V. CONCLUSION
For the electricity markets, the incentive-compatible VCG
mechanism was susceptible to collusion and shill bidding
since the market objective was in general not supermodular.
Motivated by this, we defined the supermodularity ratio to
quantify how close a set function is to being supermodular.
The supermodularity ratio of the market objective provided
us with bounds on the profitability of collusion and shill
bidding. These bounds get tighter as the ratio increases.
To this end, we derived an analytical lower bound on the
supermodularity ratio of the electricity markets. The results
derived applied to general auctions run by the VCG mech-
anism. By quantifying coalition-proofness, we can evaluate
the applicability of the VCG mechanism in terms of collusion
and shill bidding. Finally, we illustrated the tightness of the
bounds on supermodularity ratio, and verified our results
with case studies based on the IEEE test systems.
Our future work will address deriving bounds for double-
sided auctions using the idea introduced here.
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